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Abstract 
Studies have shown that authoritarian regimes tend to censor the media to limit potential threats to the status quo. While 
such censorship practices were traditionally aimed at broadcast and print media, the emergence of the Internet and social 
media in particular, prompted some authoritarian regimes, such as the Assad regime in Syria, to try and exert a similar lev-
el of censorship on the Internet as well. During the Arab Spring, the Syrian regime blocked hundreds of websites that pro-
vided social networking, news, and other services. Taking Syria as a case study, this paper examines whether Internet cen-
sorship succeeded in preventing Internet users from reaching censored online content during 2010−2012. By analyzing the 
use of Alkasir, a censorship circumvention tool created by the author, the paper provides empirical evidence demonstrat-
ing that users were in fact able to bypass censorship and access blocked websites. The findings demonstrate that censor-
ship circumvention tools constituted a threat to the information control systems of authoritarian regimes, highlighting the 
potential of such tools to promote online freedom of expression in countries where Internet censorship is prevalent. 
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1. Introduction 
When coining the term media studies 2.0, media schol-
ar William Merrin argued that the rapid growth of the 
Internet for media content creation and distribution by 
Internet users had led to a paradigm shift, which creat-
ed an urgent need for the discipline to upgrade its abil-
ity to deal with digital media in order to remain rele-
vant (Merrin, 2009, p. 9). While several social science 
scholars have studied censorship practices of broad-
cast, print and other traditional media by authoritarian 
Arab regimes (e.g., Al-Obaidi, 2007; Flew, 1998; Hardt, 
2000; Hinnebusch, 2006; Lee, 2007; Mellor, Rinnawi, & 
Dajani, 2011; Rugh, 2004), only a few scholars at-
tempted to study how censorship practices were car-
ried out against digital media (e.g., Al-Saqaf, 2014; 
Deibert, 2013; Gohdes, 2014; Howard, 2010). This pa-
per builds upon the latter group of studies but with a 
specific focus on Internet censorship and circumven-
tion in Syria around the period that immediately pre-
ceded and followed the Arab Spring1.  
Syria was found to be a suitable case study given 
that it has a well-documented and long-standing histo-
ry of traditional media censorship (Freedom House, 
2010) that was followed by a wave of Internet censor-
ship practices in 2010 and beyond (Al-Saqaf, 2014). 
This study empirically analyzes patterns of Internet 
censorship in the form of website filtering in Syria in 
the two year period stretching from October 2010 to 
October 2012 and goes one step further to assess 
whether such censorship was able to restrict access to 
those censored websites.  
The subject of this paper is relevant to social scien-
tists in general and media scholars in particular given 
                                                          
1 The Arab Spring refers to the anti-government uprising that 
started in Tunisia in December 2010 and later expanded to other 
Arab countries including Egypt, Syria, Bahrain, Yemen and Libya. 
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the well-documented use of social media by regular cit-
izens to become producers of media content instead of 
mere consumers (Gauntlett, 2007; Huang, 2011; How-
ard, Agarwal & Hussain, 2011; Shirky, 2011; Stepanova, 
2011). By 2014, over 2.8 billion people representing 
about 39% of the world’s population had access to the 
Internet (Internet World Stats, 2014). As Internet con-
nectivity continues to become more commonly availa-
ble on mobile phones, the number of global Internet 
users was expected to have reached over 3.4 billion by 
the end of 2015, bringing roughly 45% of the world’s 
population online (Cisco, 2011). According to a predic-
tion by Google CEO Eric Schmidt, the whole world will 
be connected to the Internet by 2020 (Gross, 2013). 
Furthermore, a growing number of countries have 
adopted laws considering Internet access a human 
right (Ayish, 2010). In 2014, Brazil for example, adopt-
ed Marco Civil—also called the “Constitution for the In-
ternet,”—which aims to use the Internet in ways that 
strengthen freedom of expression, individual privacy, 
and respect for human rights (Kerr, 2014). 
The research question this paper aims to address is: 
How successful were censorship practices on the Inter-
net in Syria during 2010−2012 and what does that 
mean for the future of information control by the Syri-
an regime? To answer this question, a hypothesis is 
presented arguing that the structure of the Internet as 
a decentralized network makes it possible to circum-
vent censorship easily. And with the expected rise in 
Internet use, this threatens the systems of information 
control that the Syrian and other authoritarian regimes 
have been using for generations.  
The methodology this paper uses relies on analyz-
ing data generated from Alkasir2, a software solution 
downloadable for free from the internet that the au-
thor created in 2009, which aims to help map and cir-
cumvent website censorship around the world (Al-
Saqaf, 2014, p. 317). The data collected was then ana-
lyzed to measure the level of success that users in Syria 
had in bypassing Internet censorship and accessing web-
sites blocked by the regime. In light of its theoretical 
framework and findings, the study then concludes with a 
forward-looking assessment as to what this means for 
the field of media studies in regard to the information 
control measures taken by authoritarian states. 
2. Theoretical Framework  
2.1. Controlling Information as a Trait of 
Authoritarianism 
Censorship is a practice dating back to ancient Greece 
when Socrates was executed for a message deemed to 
threaten the moral fabric of society (Stone, 1989). Over 
                                                          
2 The word ‘Alkasir’ is a transliteration from Arabic, which 
means ‘the breaker’ or ‘the circumventor’.  
time, censorship evolved to be the examination of books, 
periodicals, broadcast media, film, plays, and other me-
dia for the purpose of altering or suppressing parts 
found to be objectionable or offensive based on cultural, 
religious, political and other factors (Senat, 2011).  
Authoritarian regimes have for generations adopt-
ed various forms of censorship to depoliticize the 
population and prevent the questioning of their legiti-
macy (Linz, 1964, p. 304). Such regimes hope to be 
viewed as worthy to rule and are even willing to be 
seen as a “necessary evil” needed to address societal 
problems (Casper, 1995, p. 43). When authoritarian re-
gimes do call for public participation in politics through 
election campaigns, rallies, or referenda, they tend to 
control the message to the public by suppressing anti-
regime rhetoric and dissuading political opponents 
from forming strong coalitions (Casper, 1995, p. 45). 
This implies that oppressive practices ranging from po-
litical persecution to media control and censorship are 
therefore frequent traits associated with authoritarian-
ism and are meant to prevent the opposition from 
reaching a critical mass and consequently, threatening 
the status quo. By definition, authoritarian regimes en-
force strict obedience by the media to their political 
authority (Ostini & Ostini, 2002). They do so by exercis-
ing restrictions on the types of content published or 
broadcast to ensure that the traditional media’s role is 
confined to maintaining the existing power structures.  
With the advent of the Internet however, the role 
of traditional media started to weaken due to the abil-
ity of regular Internet users to become content pro-
ducers by utilizing decentralized and distributed net-
works such as social media (Shirky, 2011). This feature 
of the Internet was quite visible during the Arab Spring 
when activists used social media to mobilize anti-
government campaigns and organize mass rallies that 
helped trigger the downfall of two Arab dictators, Zine 
El Abidine Ben Ali of Tunisia and Hosni Mubarak of 
Egypt (Huang, 2011; Stepanova, 2011). This transfor-
mation has also given social media a strong comple-
mentary role to traditional media as demonstrated by 
Al Jazeera’s use of social media content to supplement 
its own reporting during the Arab Spring (Duffy, 2011).  
2.2. The Rise of Internet Censorship 
As the Internet became more popular and widely used 
to mobilize protest and dissent, authoritarian regimes 
evolved their media control practices to include Inter-
net censorship, which can be understood as the prac-
tice of “suppressing, limiting, or deleting objectionable 
or any other kind of speech” (Deibert, 2013, p. 139). In-
ternet censorship constitutes any act or system that 
suppresses, limits access to, or deletes any other kind 
of information published or communicated on the In-
ternet (Al-Saqaf, 2014, p. 91). 
Well before the Arab Spring, some Muslim coun-
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tries had already started practicing Internet censorship 
by prosecuting bloggers and cyber activists and by 
blocking websites (Howard, 2010, p. 175). In the case 
of Syria, by censoring social media websites such as Fa-
cebook and Blogger, the regime had inadvertently fur-
ther encouraged the use of such platforms for political 
dissent (Howard, 2010, p. 164). Following the Arab 
Spring, motives behind Internet censorship by authori-
tarian regimes in the Arab world appeared to stem 
from their desire to prevent dissenting voices from 
reaching the public and hence, stifling political opposi-
tion and protecting the status quo (Al-Saqaf, 2014). 
Those motives are aligned with those that made au-
thoritarian regimes censor dissenting voices in tradi-
tional broadcast and print media. 
Technically speaking, implementing Internet cen-
sorship often involves the use of filtering software to 
block access to websites in a particular network or en-
vironment (Hersberger, 2004, p. 265). Such filtering can 
target an individual’s private computer, or can occur on 
a wider intranet level where the responsible network 
administrator or Internet service provider (ISP) sets up 
a digital firewall to prevent access to certain websites 
that include particular keywords or meet some other 
matching criteria. If a user tries to access any of those 
blocked websites, he/she would normally get an ‘Ac-
cess Denied’ page or some other notice (Hersberger, 
2004, p. 266). Internet censorship of a website can 
happen on a national level when all ISPs in the country 
in question block the same website. While independ-
ent filtering mechanisms for some countries are based 
on the terms of usage and rules that each ISP needs to 
enforce, e.g., blocking pornography, gambling, etc., 
studies have found that national Internet censorship is 
often devised to suppress the dissemination of dissi-
dent messages (Al-Saqaf, 2014; Bennett, Grothoff, Ho-
rozov, & Lindgren, 2003, p. 1).  
The lion’s share of research regarding Internet cen-
sorship has so far focused on China, where the regime 
maintains what is arguably the world’s most sophisti-
cated and comprehensive national Internet censorship 
system. Often referred to as “The Great Firewall of 
China”, the Chinese Internet censorship system relies 
on a diverse set of censorship strategies ranging from 
website filtering (Deibert, Palfrey, Rohozinski, & 
Zittrain, 2008) to internal blog content monitoring and 
blocking (MacKinnon, 2008) and often includes legal 
measures that lead to the prosecution of bloggers us-
ing existing laws (Liang & Lu, 2010, pp. 116-117).  
In the Arab world, website filtering is but one of 
several forms of censorship, which include prosecution, 
threats, physical intimidation, and surveillance (Zar-
wan, 2005). Murdoch and Anderson (2008, p. 65) de-
tailed nine mechanisms of Internet censorship ranging 
from technical website filtering to domain deregistra-
tion and attacks on websites. Cyber laws can be con-
sidered a form of Internet censorship if they curtail 
freedom of access or use of the Internet as demon-
strated by Iraq, whose proposed cyber laws were seen 
as a means of targeting journalists, whistleblowers, and 
activists (Sutton, 2012). Similarly, the UAE’s decrees on 
cyber crime led to restrictions on the ability of citizens 
to criticize the state on the Internet and promoted self-
censorship (Gradstein, 2012).  
2.3. The Internet and Liberation Technology 
The debate regarding the positive and negative uses of 
the Internet as a technology was invoked by Thierer 
(2010), who contrasted the views of “Internet opti-
mists” with those of “Internet pessimists”. Internet op-
timists include researchers such as Negroponte (1996), 
Surowiecki (2005), and Shirky (2011), who argue that 
the Internet contributes positively to freedom of ex-
pression, innovation, participation, anonymous com-
munication, and empowerment. Internet pessimists 
such as Postman (1993), Keen (2007), and Morozov 
(2011) however, view the Internet as a technology that 
could be misused and abused. Some Internet pessi-
mists argue that the Internet could debase culture, 
lead to the lack of accountability or serve as a tool used 
by governments to target activists or journalists. These 
contrasting views reflect what I see as the neutral and 
conduit nature of the Internet, which itself cannot be 
good or bad, but rather, it can be used for good causes 
as well as bad ones. 
On the one hand, the Internet has the potential to 
support economic development and this aspect could 
be a strong incentive for its embrace by authoritarian 
states (Shirky, 2011, p. 37). But on the other hand, it 
can also be used to stifle human rights not only in au-
thoritarian states, but also in advanced democracies as 
demonstrated by the mass surveillance practices car-
ried out covertly by the National Security Agency (NSA) 
of the United States as revealed in 2013 by former NSA 
contractor Edward Snowden, who leaked around 
200,000 classified documents detailing the a clandes-
tine mass surveillance program with the government 
code name PRISM (Anton, 2013). This is particularly 
troublesome given that PRISM used private communi-
cations on Google, Facebook, and other major plat-
forms in its surveillance practices.  
Authoritarian regimes did also use the Internet 
against activists as highlighted by Morozov (2011), who 
argued that cyber activists could be targeted using var-
ious mechanisms, for example by having a social media 
network decide to reveal their identity to authoritarian 
states, or causing them to be exiled due to affiliation 
with US-sponsored training. This would be in addition 
to the exposure of Internet users to surveillance, 
trolling, censorship, and even prosecution for down-
loading some types of censorship circumvention soft-
ware (Morozov, 2011).  
In relation to the use of the Internet by authoritari-
 Media and Communication, 2016, Volume 4, Issue 1, Pages 39-50 42 
an regimes against activists, a study by Gohdes (2014) 
found that the Syrian regime remained in control of ac-
cess to some social media through censorship—
including network disruptions—and surveillance. In her 
study, the author illustrates the use of surveillance as a 
means to monitor the flow of information between ac-
tivists on the ground in order to track names, locations 
and other information for ‘targeted violence’ (Gohdes, 
2014, p. 3). This illustrates the dangers of using social 
media in times of conflict, which highlights the dark 
side of the Internet. However, it was noticeable that 
Gohdes did not refer in her study to censorship cir-
cumvention tools, which could have partially contrib-
uted to addressing the censorship problem.  
The two sides reflect an ongoing and thorny debate 
that will probably continue for a long time. A more 
constructive approach to this debate however, could 
be the one taken by Diamond (2012), who coined the 
term “liberation technology” to mean “any form of in-
formation and communication technology (ICT) that 
can expand political, social, and economic freedom” 
(Diamond, 2012, p. 4). While Diamond argued that lib-
eration technology has the potential to be used for the 
good of society, he did not rule out the possibility that 
it could also be abused. Advocates of liberation tech-
nology do acknowledge that like any other neutral tool, 
the Internet could have empowering and disempower-
ing effects depending on context and other factors. In 
this paper, the focus is on the positive aspects of liber-
ation technology while acknowledging that there are 
also some negative aspects. 
2.4. Censorship Circumvention Tools as a Liberation 
Technology 
In this paper, Internet censorship circumvention tools 
are considered to be a liberation technology because 
they expand political and social rights of citizens by al-
lowing them to access websites containing dissident 
content that authoritarian regimes wish to hide from 
the public. Those tools work because they exploit one 
of the most fundamental characteristics of the Inter-
net, i.e., decentralization. After all, when the Internet 
was born in 1969 at the US Advanced Research Pro-
jects Agency Network (ARPANET), it was built as a 
communication network that could survive a major at-
tack. Because it is not centrally controlled, its solid and 
resilient distributed architecture allows it to operate 
even if large parts of the underlying networks are de-
stroyed (Brand, 2001).  
Censorship circumvention tools rely on proxies, 
which are analogous to intermediary agents that 
serve as a bridge between two communicating parties. 
When a recipient and a sender of information are pre-
vented from direct communication, they can use a 
middleman who is not forbidden from individually in-
teracting with either of them. In case the middleman 
loses access to either party due to censorship or other 
reasons, an alternative middleman can be used to 
maintain the communication. The middleman is a met-
aphor for a proxy server that is able to reach both the 
Internet user and the blocked website. For example, 
for a person in Beijing to access http://facebook.com, 
which—as of the time this article was written—is 
blocked in China, a circumvention tool could be used 
to reroute the traffic to that website via a proxy serv-
er based in the United States, for example, and send 
the data in an encrypted form back to the user. One 
common feature of circumvention tools is that they 
all rely on proxy servers to overcome censorship (Pal-
frey, Roberts, & Zuckerman, 2011, p. 5).  
Theoretically, any server that is able to reach the 
user and target a website simultaneously could serve 
as a proxy. This entails that a regime with a strong 
enough determination to block access to a particular 
website would have to block access to all potential 
proxy servers, which is virtually impossible without 
blocking significant parts of the whole Internet. Such a 
scenario, however, is highly unlikely because the global 
expansion of the Internet made it indispensable for 
communication, business, government, transportation, 
and various other vital public and private uses (Hoff-
man, Novak, & Venkatesh, 2004; Stepanova, 2011, p. 2; 
Varnelis, 2012).  
That being said, at least one authoritarian regime 
had reportedly shut down national access to the Inter-
net as demonstrated by the case of Egypt in January 
2011 (Cowie, 2011). Initially, the regime reportedly or-
dered ISPs to block access to Facebook and Twitter 
(Schonfeld, 2011). But as the availability of censorship 
circumvention tools and methods rendered website fil-
tering ineffective, the regime took the radical step of 
shutting down access to the Internet as a whole from 
January 27 to February 2 (Cowie, 2011). Yet that step 
appears to have backfired as it led to even more pro-
testers, some of whom wanted to be informed about 
developments directly given that they were no longer 
able to access information online (Khamis & Vaughn, 
2011, pp. 15-16). It was quite evident that the decision 
to completely block citizens’ access to the Internet did 
not prevent the planned protest on Friday January 28. 
When Egypt was brought back online on February 2, 
the protests had already reached unprecedented sizes, 
eventually leading to the resignation of Egyptian presi-
dent Hosni Mubarak on February 11 (McGreal & Shen-
ker, 2011).  
The Egyptian example presents a clear dilemma for 
authoritarian states trying to censor the Internet. On 
the one hand, they cannot prevent users from using 
censorship circumvention tools to access blocked web-
sites. Yet on the other, they can’t afford to shut down 
the Internet altogether because doing so would nega-
tively affect the economy and cripple government 
agencies (Howard et al., 2011, p. 217).  
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3. The Syrian Context 
3.1. Traits of an Authoritarian Baathist Regime 
When Bashar Assad inherited power from his deceased 
father Hafez Assad in 2000, he also took charge of the 
Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party, which had ruled the coun-
try with an iron fist since 1963 (Pipes, 1989). Just after 
the Arab Spring started however, the media reported 
grave human rights violations and widespread and sys-
tematic abuses across the country (Black, 2012). As is 
the case with authoritarian regimes, Assad’s legitimacy 
to rule was not based on a democratic process and was 
often questioned by various opposition entities and 
dissidents, most of which had to operate in exile due to 
the Syrian regime’s tendency to assassinate opposition 
figures (Zahler, 2009, p. 66).  
The Syrian constitution does refer in a few clauses 
to citizens’ right to individual freedom (Heller, 1974). 
However, restrictions on freedom of expression 
through different means including acts of censorship 
remained the norm and intensified since 2001, when 
the Press Law was enacted, giving authorities the right 
to deny and revoke publishing licenses of newspapers as 
well as enforce blatant press censorship (Freedom 
House, 2010). Assaults on journalists and banning of 
newspapers coming from certain countries or containing 
certain types of content were carried out on the grounds 
of protecting Syrian national security. The Press Law im-
posed a hefty fine of up to a million Syrian pounds, 
which was valued around USD 20,000 in 2010, and 
granted the judiciary the power to give jail terms that 
range from one to three years (Freedom House, 2010). 
Based on that law, any form of speech, whether written, 
spoken, or electronic, could be considered punishable if 
deemed a threat to national sovereignty or security or if 
it is thought to offend public morality. Among the most 
strictly censored messages are those that advocate au-
tonomy or self-rule for Kurds, who are prohibited from 
importing Kurdish-language publications (Ziadeh, 2009). 
Dissidents in Syria are usually unable to challenge 
the regime through traditional media because publish-
ing houses and media outlets are either owned or in-
fluenced by the state and are mobilized in active sup-
port for the regime (Rugh, 2004, p. 56). Security 
agencies work with total impunity and operate under 
the direct oversight of the presidential office and are 
known for committing acts of torture to extract infor-
mation and admissions from suspects or their relatives 
(Freedom House, 2010).  
The systematic repressive practices by the Syrian re-
gime over the years have weakened the internal opposi-
tion and resulted in a thriving exiled dissident move-
ment, which is composed of several competing factions 
including moderate Sunnis, Kurds, Islamists, liberals, and 
others (Lund, 2012). The regime’s grip on the media and 
the economy was further enhanced through notably 
strong ties with Iran and Russia, which are two powers 
with a strong stake in the region (Landis & Pace, 2007). 
3.2. Internet Access and Censorship in Syria 
The Internet was cautiously introduced to Syria in 1997 
when a very limited number of state institutions were 
connected and operated in a highly restrictive and se-
curity-driven setting (Goldstein, 1999, pp. 55-56). 
When Bashar Assad became president in 2000, he ex-
panded Internet access, which grew from 30,000 users 
in 2000 to over five million in 2012, representing a 
penetration ratio of 22.5% (Internet World Stats, 
2013). The rapid growth of the Internet was used by 
the regime to expand its information propaganda to 
the masses and attack dissidents in a virtual cyberwar 
(Watson, 2011). Despite this growth, Syria's online en-
vironment remained highly controlled and regulated by 
the Ministry of Telecommunications and Technology 
through the Syrian Telecommunications Establishment 
(ONI, 2009). Investments by the regime in the tele-
communication infrastructure were coupled with a 
monopoly of the ISP sector led by SyriaTel, a wireless 
3G GSM and Internet operator owned by the first 
cousin of President Assad, Rami Makhlouf (US Depart-
ment of Treasury, 2008). Nepotism and favoritism were 
practiced widely in the country, signaling a state of cor-
ruption and inefficiency (Schmidt, 2006). 
As Internet usage grew in Syria, so did restrictions 
on online freedoms as manifested by the pervasive In-
ternet filtering practiced by the state, which blocked 
numerous dissident websites as well as major social 
media platforms such as Facebook and YouTube (ONI, 
2009). The international media freedom monitoring 
watchdog Reporters without Borders (RSF) named Syr-
ia in 2010 as one of the “enemies of the Internet” due 
to its repressive practices restricting freedom of ex-
pression on the Internet (RSF, 2010). Since the uprisings 
started in the beginning of 2011, at least ten citizen 
journalists and online activists were reportedly killed by 
the end of the year, after which the number spiked five-
fold to 49 deaths in 2012 (RSF, 2013). The Syrian regime 
started in 2011 to ban traditional journalists from going 
into the country for reporting. This resulted in a high 
number of casualties among citizen journalists, who be-
came a major source of news (Arnold, 2012). Further-
more, the lack of sufficient experience in safe communi-
cation, encryption techniques and other digital 
protections made online journalists vulnerable to being 
identified, tracked, and targeted (Galperin, 2012). 
3.3. From a Potential Revolution to an All-Out Civil War 
Inspired by the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, Syrians 
in the city of Dara’a took to the streets in big numbers 
in March 2011 demanding more rights and to protest 
the arrest of schoolboys for writing political graffiti call-
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ing for an end to the Assad regime (Macleod, 2011). 
The protests were faced with a violent security crack-
down, which resulted in more and bigger protests to a 
degree that prompted the regime to cut taxes and raise 
state salaries. Soon after, Assad attempted to deal with 
public anger by ending the state of emergency that was 
in place since 1963 and issued a decree to dissolve the 
long-feared state security court and to regulate the 
right to peaceful protest (Oweis, 2011). Despite these 
measures, violence intensified and opposition groups 
turned from peaceful protests to armed rebellion, sup-
ported by defections of military and government per-
sonnel and followed by mounting international pres-
sure (Myers, 2011). When the opposition Free Syrian 
Army was formed in July 2011, it helped transform the 
popular peaceful uprisings to a militant opposition that 
led to an all-out civil war (Karam & Kennedy, 2011). 
By 2013, the UN reported a death toll exceeding 
60,000 with over half a million internally displaced 
(Hubbard & Jordans, 2013). Additionally, hundreds of 
thousands of Syrian refugees fled across the borders to 
Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon, resulting in over one mil-
lion refugees (Sweis, 2013). The types and magnitude 
of the crimes committed by the Assad regime since 
2011 made it a candidate for an international tribunal 
for committing war crimes and crimes against humani-
ty, which discouraged the regime from handing over 
power to a transitional government (Walt, 2012).  
4. Discussion 
4.1. Methodology 
This study uses data collected through Alkasir website 
censorship mapping and circumvention tool to quantify 
website censorship in Syria during October 2010− 
October 2012. I originally created the software in 2009 
as a means to circumvent censorship of my own news 
aggregator website yemenportal.net, which was blocked 
in 2008 by the Yemeni authorities citing concerns that it 
may have posed “national security” risks because it al-
lowed dissident content to be viewed on it (Al-Saqaf, 
2014, p. 326). Alkasir started out as a Microsoft Win-
dows application that enabled Internet users to report 
blocked websites and access them freely afterwards us-
ing a secure and encrypted tunnel to a proxy server lo-
cated in the United States. By October 2012 however, 
Alkasir had been installed over 72,000 times and was 
downloaded in more than a hundred countries around 
the world.  
The sample used for this paper is confined to the 
data generated by users inside Syria. Alkasir’s proxy is a 
US-based server, which fetches data from blocked 
websites requested by the users and sends those web-
sites’ content to the users in an encrypted format that 
the ISP cannot read. This renders the censor role of the 
ISP useless because all it sees is garbled encrypted traf-
fic exchanged with a destination that is not meant to 
be censored, i.e., Alkasir’s proxy server3. 
The software was used to identify blocked websites 
in Syria by allowing users to report them first before 
being able to access them through a special proxy 
server. Every user running Alkasir had a graphical user 
interface with clearly marked buttons that were used 
to report one or more websites. There were over twenty 
thousand instances of Alkasir being voluntarily installed 
and used by users using different ISPs inside Syria during 
October 2010−October 2012. This allowed the detection 
of national website censorship to a highly reliable de-
gree. The technical data was stored securely in a MySQL 
database on a US-based server that also hosted Alkasir’s 
official website (https://alkasir.com). Raw MySQL data-
base content was later manually converted to datasets 
and imported to a computer running IBM SPSS4. 
For the study to identify which websites were fil-
tered nationally, it was necessary to have multiple re-
ports coming from users in different parts of the coun-
try using different ISPs. Otherwise, a website filtered 
by a single ISP may be mistakenly interpreted as being 
censored nationally. A public library or cyber cafe, for 
example, could block facebook.com due to the terms 
of service. If a student attempts to access face-
book.com they can still report the website and access it 
through Alkasir, which adds the ISP to a database con-
taining information about censored websites in Syria. If 
someone else using another ISP in another part of the 
country also reports the website blocked, that ISP is 
added to the database as well. The more ISPs found to 
block a particular website, the more likely that it is 
blocked nationally. This study considers that websites 
reported to be blocked by a threshold of more than 15 
ISPs to be blocked nation-wide.  
One of the limitations of Alkasir is its inability to 
know precisely when a website was unblocked. This is 
because it relies on the users’ active updates by report-
ing websites regularly. It is rarely the case that users 
report a particular website regularly to keep its status 
up-to-date. This meant that in order for a website to be 
removed from the list of nationally censored websites, 
manual intervention was needed to directly remove 
the website from the database containing the list of 
blocked websites in a specific country. This procedure 
was not used in the case of Syria given the high proba-
bility that a website that was blocked before would be 
blocked again in the future.  
Alkasir has an internal web browser, which allows it 
to collect metadata on the frequency of access to vari-
ous blocked websites. Every attempt to access a 
blocked website via the browser increments the total 
                                                          
3 A more thorough description of how Alkasir works can be 
found in an earlier study (Al-Saqaf, 2014) 
4 IBM SPSS is software that many social science researchers use 
for statistical analysis. 
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number of page views of the website. The study was 
able to identify the total number of views of blocked 
content without having to identify who accessed them 
because no personal information that could be used to 
identify users was saved on the server due to privacy 
considerations. The quantitative data collected over 
the period of the study includes data about the report-
ed websites, the countries and ISPs that blocked them, 
the number of times Alkasir was accessed, and the 
number of page views of each website. The data was 
then analyzed using SPSS to identify patterns that an-
swered the study’s research questions. 
4.2. Findings 
When studying patterns of Alkasir usage in Syria, it was 
found that the number of successful connections to the 
proxy server increased from 13,826 in October 2010 to 
958,548 in October 2012, which is a seventy-fold rise. 
In order to understand whether this increase was trig-
gered by any developments on the ground in Syria, a 
deeper analysis was carried out. The analysis revealed 
a noticeable sharp rise at the peak of the Tunisian and 
Egyptian uprisings in January 2011 in terms of the 
number of censored websites reported as shown in 
Figure 1. After a relative period of calm, a renewed 
wave of reports was witnessed in July 2011, which is 
when a heavy wave of defections from the Syrian army 
took place, later leading to the creation of the Free Syr-
ian Army (AFP, 2011). After another period of limited 
website censorship reporting activity, a spike emerged 
in mid-2012. The highest number of websites reported 
censored was in July 2012 when 677 unique Websites 
were reported 3,207 times in total. By October 2012, 
the number of page views of blocked websites in Syria 
through the internal browser reached over 4.4 million 
while the number of installations reached 22,415. 
By more closely examining the month of July 2012, 
one can see that there were two spikes on July 15 and 
26 as shown in Figure 2. The first spike on Sunday July 15 
coincided with the Free Syrian Army’s announcement to 
launch the operations Damascus Volcano and Syrian 
Earthquake aimed at liberating the capital Damascus 
(Karouny, 2012). The other spike occurred on Thursday 
July 26 when strong signs of an imminent battle in Alep-
po emerged a day after the Free Syrian Army took con-
trol of some of its districts (Weaver & Whitaker, 2012). 
The empirical data shows that as a censorship cir-
cumvention tool, Alkasir was indeed used effectively to 
bypass government-imposed censorship at a very deli-
cate and important period in the history of Syria. This 
indicates that the Syrian regime strived to control the 
flow of information online using filtering software. 
However, the decentralized and open design of the In-
ternet allowed users to overcome the challenge of cen-
sorship to remain informed. 
When looking into the specific censored online con-
tent that was accessed using Alkasir, the results re-
vealed that online resources such as social media and 
media sharing websites received the highest attention. 
As the pie chart in Figure 3 shows, social media consti-
tuted around 92% of all visits to blocked websites dur-
ing the period represented in this paper. Within the so-
cial media group, the dominant website was Facebook 
with around 98% of the visits followed by other less 
known social media websites. The Syrian regime’s cen-
soring of Facebook could be attributable to its per-
ceived threat as a means to mobilize rallies and pro-
tests through social media, leading to the overthrow of 
the Tunisian and Egyptian presidents. 
 
Figure 1. Level of user activity in reporting censorship through Alkasir in Syria. 
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Figure 2. Level of user activity in reporting censorship through Alkasir in Syria during July 2012. 
 
Figure 3. Visits of censored websites using Alkasir in 
Syria. 
Table 1. The top ten censored websites.  
Website Category 
1. facebook.com Social Networking 
2. youtube.com Multimedia Sharing 
3. tagged.com Social Networking 
4. mig33.com Social Networking 
5. all4syria.info Dissident 
6. aawsat.com News and Opinion 
7. netlog.com Social Networking 
8. store.ovi.com Commercial 
9. skype.com VOIP 
10. adobe.com Commercial 
The second group of blocked websites included those 
that allow the sharing of multimedia content, such as 
YouTube, which was also used to expose footage por-
traying the destruction of homes and properties by As-
sad forces. YouTube videos were also shared on Face-
book showing images of injured and killed civilians by 
the shelling of villages and cities where opposition 
forces were based. It is therefore evident that bypass-
ing censorship of such platforms by utilizing Alkasir 
helped broaden the perspective of Internet users and 
allowed them to access information from sources that 
are not controlled by the regime.  
Table 1 shows the top list of blocked websites in 
terms of number of visits using Alkasir in Syria during 
the period covered by this paper. The top website, Fa-
cebook, was by far the most dominant with over 92% 
of all visits. Four of the ten websites were categorized 
as social media, which demonstrates the high value Al-
kasir users gave to the ability to interact and share in-
formation online. Alkasir did have the potential to al-
low users to access hundreds of other blocked 
websites as well but they received a much smaller 
number of visits. 
While these findings point to a strong interest by 
users in accessing social media websites, it is important 
to note that one cannot conclude with certainty that 
the users of Alkasir used it merely to access and share 
anti-government content or used the software purely 
for mobilizing protests or dissident activities. However, 
it is possible to conclude that the attempt by the Syrian 
regime to prevent the public from accessing Facebook 
after the downfall of the presidents of Egypt and Tuni-
sia illustrates a perceived threat by the social network-
ing website to its authority. The study’s findings point 
to the determination of users in Syria to access Face-
book in large numbers despite the ban, allowing Alkasir 
to emerge as a liberation technology with the potential 
to limit information control by the government and al-
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low users to engage in political mobilization through 
the web. 
Additionally, the fact that censorship increased with 
developments on the ground and that among the top 
blocked websites was all4syria.info, a news website 
that included stories that promoted the Free Syrian 
Army, lends support to the hypothesis that Alkasir was 
also used to disseminate and access dissident material. 
In a time of conflict, such a contribution is arguably 
positive because it supports the free flow of infor-
mation by limiting the regime’s ability to manipulate 
online content. 
While no particular qualitative research was carried 
out in this study, it is worthy noting that the use of Al-
kasir to prevent information blackouts during the Syri-
an conflict was in some way life saving as well. This was 
found by interviewing one of the Syrian activists who 
used Alkasir for an extended period of time. In a per-
sonal communication by email in 2013, he gave a cou-
ple of examples demonstrating how the use of Alkasir 
may have helped save lives. The activist, who request-
ed to remain anonymous for his safety, said that he 
used Alkasir to publish footage and videos on Facebook 
and YouTube from areas affected by the fighting. He 
indicated that he was also able to use Alkasir to com-
municate a warning message through Skype, a voice 
chatting platform blocked in Syria at the time. The 
warning he sent had arrived just in time to the intend-
ed recipients, who were also using Alkasir, giving them 
the chance to evacuate an area before it was raided by 
the regime’s security.  
The activist gave a second example of a case when 
he used Alkasir to access blocked online resources, 
which he then used to communicate to international 
humanitarian missions to provide urgently needed 
humanitarian aid. The anonymous Syrian activist said: 
“When inspection operations began seeking leaders 
and organizers of the revolution, the software allowed 
us to send warnings on Skype or Facebook that security 
vehicles were approaching a particular neighborhood 
or street.” (Syrian Activist, personal communication, 24 
July, 2013)  
These two examples illustrate that in certain situa-
tions during a conflict, having a tool to break free from 
censorship could be a matter of life or death. By em-
powering even a single individual in times of war, Al-
kasir demonstrates that technology can be used for the 
good of society. 
It is important to note that while Alkasir was mainly 
used to access censored social media, the above exam-
ples illustrate that in order to assess the impact of a 
particular technology, one should not only take the 
number of visitors of blocked websites into account 
but should consider the significance of the type of con-
tent being circulated via those blocked websites. It 
might well be that a few users were able to access a 
censored website to upload timely and critical reports 
to the web. But the content they uploaded may have a 
substantial impact nationally and even globally. War 
news and footage published on Facebook using Alkasir 
for example, could then reach remote parts of the 
world and be shared and be picked even by transna-
tional broadcast media. Such an impact is very difficult 
to assess, but should not to be ignored. 
5. Conclusion 
For a long time, media studies remained well behind 
the times by failing to adequately study how the Inter-
net is used for political mobilization and dissent. The 
Arab Spring was a point in history when media scholars 
tried to catch up by studying the use of social media to 
promote freedom for people living under the rule of 
authoritarian regimes. However, many of those schol-
ars fell in love with positive aspects of social media 
studies and very few made an effort to highlight the 
reaction of authoritarian regimes in the form of Inter-
net censorship and the use of censorship circumven-
tion tools as a form of liberation technology in re-
sponse to the growth of censorship on the web.  
This study is among the few that stand out in this 
area with a special focus on Syria. The study tried to 
understand how the Syrian regime censored the Inter-
net during the initial period of the Arab Spring. By high-
lighting how Internet users in Syria fought back using 
censorship circumvention tools and eventually defeat-
ed website blocking, the study opens new doors to fur-
ther explore this new and relatively unexplored area of 
research.  
Being the seemingly indestructible, decentralized 
and global network that it is, the Internet will continue 
to garner more interest in the media studies field par-
ticularly as repressive practices by authoritarian re-
gimes are expected to continue and evolve over time. 
The strong and unwavering resistance to repression as 
demonstrated by the Syrians that used censorship cir-
cumvention technology is a sign that the subject of In-
ternet censorship will continue to be important and at-
tract more research. 
It is necessary however to critically reflect on the 
role of Internet censorship circumvention tools given 
that their ability to unblock websites is insufficient to 
address Internet censorship, which includes many other 
forms of practices that range from prosecuting bloggers 
to practicing mass surveillance on activists. While this 
study helps shed light on the important role those tools 
have, it merely scratches the surface when it comes to 
addressing the many forms of Internet censorship.  
Furthermore, by serving as an intermediate agent 
between a user and a blocked website, any circumven-
tion tool becomes vulnerable in its own right. With in-
creased sophistication in online monitoring and track-
ing techniques, authoritarian regime are improving 
their capacity to identify the methods and operators of 
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those circumvention tools and take some steps to ren-
der them ineffective. Financial incentives to companies 
to stop hosting proxy servers could also be a move that 
some larger governments may take. While not invinci-
ble, censorship circumvention tools should be support-
ed and encouraged to improve and spread to limit the 
ability of authoritarian regimes to target them. 
It is unlikely that the Syrian regime will give up the 
fight against censorship circumvention tools. In fact, it 
is likely that it will try other ways to limit the ability of 
citizens to challenge its authority. Surveillance strate-
gies as demonstrated by Gohdes (2014) could perhaps 
be a preference over censorship in the long run if those 
circumvention tools continue to be successful. Such a 
scenario could be devastating to activists if they are 
not diligent and careful when publishing personal in-
formation on social media.  
The door is open to carry out more research in this 
exciting and growing field. What is needed more than 
ever is to engage media scholars with questions about 
liberation technology because the conversation sur-
rounding freedom of expression and censorship on the 
Internet will likely continue unabated. 
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